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AbsTrACT
background Increasing the price of tobacco products 
has the potential to reduce tobacco consumption. 
As other forms of promotion have been increasingly 
restricted over time, tobacco manufacturers have relied 
more on trade discounts. Minimum price laws that 
prevented the use of manufacturer promotions were 
once common; however in most US jurisdictions these 
discounts are now legally protected.
Methods We collected tobacco industry documents, 
state legislation and court cases between 1987 and 
2016 to review tobacco manufacturer strategies to 
change minimum price laws in the USA.
results Beginning in 2000, tobacco manufacturers 
lobbied to amend minimum price legislation after state 
regulators indicated that manufacturer promotions were 
illegal under existing laws. Companies viewed changing 
these laws as critical to maintaining tobacco sales, and 
after the initiation of an industry lobbying campaign, at 
least 20 states changed the way they calculated tobacco 
prices.
Conclusions Modifying existing minimum price laws 
so that manufacturer discounts are no longer protected, 
and implementing new minimum price policies with 
comparable scope, would likely increase prices and 
reduce tobacco use.
InTrOduCTIOn
Tobacco is the leading preventable cause of mortality 
in the USA, causing over 480 000 deaths each 
year.1 2 In 1998 the US Master Settlement Agree-
ment (MSA) between 46 states and major tobacco 
manufacturers restricted existing advertising venues 
for tobacco, including most forms of outdoor 
advertising and product placement.3 The 2003 
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(FCTC) committed parties to implementing strong 
marketing restrictions around the world.4 Over the 
same time, governments increased tobacco excise 
taxes to generate revenues and reduce smoking 
prevalence.5 Tobacco manufacturer discounts to 
US cigarette retailers in 2017 totalled $6.2 billion, 
representing 70% of advertising costs, up from 
43% before the 1998 MSA.6 7 These promotions 
have expanded over time despite the existence of 
minimum price laws in over half of the states.8 9
The tobacco industry has used targeted lower 
prices to increase consumption since at least the 
1880s10 and this strategy has escalated as marketing 
restrictions increase.
Minimum price laws, also known as unfair ciga-
rette sales acts (UCSAs), set a minimum price or 
minimum markup amount retailers apply to tobacco 
products above wholesale cost.8 9 11 States first 
enacted UCSAs in the 1940s and these laws have 
historically covered at least half of the states.12–17 
The stated intent of these laws was to ‘avoid 
unfair competition and discrimination’.12 Tobacco 
wholesalers and retailers were early supporters of 
UCSAs, which limited potential business canni-
balisation by discounters willing to sell tobacco 
below cost to attract customers. Similar policies, 
also known as sales- below- cost laws, apply to other 
products including milk, alcohol and gasoline, 
and their application has been shown to decrease 
consumption.18–22
Research has consistently found that increasing 
tobacco prices reduces consumption.23–27 The estab-
lishment of minimum prices has been an underap-
preciated public health intervention; the FCTC, for 
example, does not suggest extensive regulation on 
tobacco retailing.28 Minimum price laws have not 
necessarily led to higher consumer prices.9 29–32 
Although such laws can increase the cost of tobacco 
if legal calculations account for manufacturer 
discounts to retailers, few states do so.8 33
Between 2001 and 2008, legislators in nearly 
every state with a minimum price law proposed revi-
sions to protect tobacco manufacturers’ ability to 
offer trade discounts, and at least 20 states changed 
how they calculated prices. We sought to determine 
whether this change reflected tobacco industry 
advocacy. Internal industry documents34 revealed 
that tobacco manufacturers developed an extensive 
lobbying campaign to protect trade discounts when 
calculating legal minimum prices to counter stricter 
tobacco control laws and market to price- sensitive 
smokers. Revising minimum price laws to block 
manufacturer promotions would undercut tobacco 
industry efforts to reduce the cost of tobacco and 
promote public health.23 28 31 35
MeThOds
Between June 2018 and July 2019, we searched 
the Truth Tobacco Industry Documents Library34 
using established snowball methods.36–41 We began 
with ‘minimum price’ and ‘unfair cigarette sales’; 
searches were refined using names of states, corpo-
rate departments and employees, campaigns by date 
and materials identified from nearby documents 
using Bates numbers. We screened documents for 
relevance and duplication, organised them into a 
timeline and summarised material when multiple 
documents made similar claims, with critical claims 
quoted exactly. Following standard practices, 
we triangulated these documents and with other 
sources, including news and research articles and the 
text of all proposed and passed legislation relative 
to tobacco from 2000 to 2019, which were drawn 
from Nexis Uni and state legislative archives.42 43 
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Figure 1 Legal price under different calculations.
Our final analysis included over 100 documents dated between 
1987 and 2016. Additional details on methods are provided in 
the online supplementary file.
resulTs
uCsAs and manufacturer promotions
A range of tobacco manufacturer promotions can reduce 
consumer prices, including coupons, which provide a discount 
to specific purchasers at the point of sale. Manufacturers can also 
provide promotions to specific retailers through ‘buydowns’.12 44 
Tobacco manufacturers describe buydowns as ‘‘paperless coupon’ 
promotions in which the manufacturer asks a retailer to reduce 
the price charged for a brand by a specific amount and pays the 
retailer the difference between its regular selling price and the 
‘bought down’ price actually charged to the consumer during the 
promotion’.12 These targeted promotions allow manufacturers 
to reduce the costs for specific favoured retailers rather than to 
reduce prices uniformly. Retailers must qualify for buydowns, 
often by displaying promotional materials provided by manufac-
turers and meeting product placement requirements.45
After the MSA, tobacco manufacturers lobbied for technical 
changes to state minimum price laws that reduced the prices 
consumers paid for cigarettes by excluding manufacturer promo-
tions from the cost of the legally determined price. Figure 1 
shows a simplified example of the different components of 
‘minimum price’ and how it could be manipulated.
 ► Legal minimum price (column 1): The state has set the 
minimum price of a pack of cigarettes at $3.00, determining 
that cost of purchasing a pack of cigarettes from the manu-
facturer is $1.75, and adding a retailer markup of $1.25, 
which represents the retailer calculated costs (eg, estimated 
rent and labour). The consumer pays the required minimum 
price of $3.00.
 ► Illegal coupon (column 2): Under minimum price laws, it 
is illegal for retailers to lower prices by offering a below- 
calculated- cost retailer- to- consumer coupon. In this 
example, the illegal $0.25 coupon would leave the consumer 
paying $2.75, which is less than the required minimum price 
of $3.00.
 ► Illegal buydown (column 3): Minimum price laws may 
also make it illegal for the manufacturers to lower prices 
for specific retailers by offering a below- calculated- cost 
manufacturer- to- retailer buydown. In this example, the 
manufacturer provides an illegal $0.50 buydown that would 
leave the consumer paying $2.50, which is less than the 
required minimum price of $3.00.
 ► Protected trade discounts (column 4): Some states allow 
manufacturers to lower prices for specific retailers by offering 
below- calculated- cost manufacturer- to- retailer buydowns. In 
this example, the buydown is $0.50, leaving the consumer to 
pay $2.50. The $0.50 buydown is excluded from the calcula-
tion of the minimum price for legal purposes—$3.00—even 
though the manufacturer discount reduces the price smokers 
pay to $2.50.
In practice, such calculations are usually more complicated 
because legal minimum prices are often determined by calcu-
lating discounts and markups on a percentage basis.46
The 1990s: new (and sometimes illegal) manufacturer price 
promotions
Before the 1990s, states applied minimum price laws to protect 
wholesalers and retailers from discount outlets and the laws 
drew little attention from manufacturers.47–49 In 1987, when 
Nevada distributors convinced legislators to introduce an UCSA, 
the Tobacco Institute (the manufacturers’ lobbying organisation 
at the time) took no position on the bill.50
In the early 1990s, UCSAs began interfering with new price 
promotions created by tobacco manufacturers. In 1993, Philip 
Morris learnt that not all retailers were able to use an intended 
price promotion to lower prices because some operated in states 
with minimum price laws.51 In 1994, for example, state regu-
lators found that Ohio and Pennsylvania retailers violated state 
law by selling Philip Morris products below legally mandated 
prices.52 In response, the Pennsylvania Distributors Association, a 
trade association of tobacco wholesalers and retailers, advocated 
to modify the state’s UCSA to allow manufacturer promotions.53 
That same year, Lorillard executives found that Minnesota’s law 
could block their price promotions54 and Minnesota wholesalers 
forwarded a letter from the state’s Department of Revenue to 
Philip Morris’ sales department stating that its manufacturer 
rebates were illegal.55
By 1995, RJ Reynolds tracked and classified state UCSAs to 
determine how ‘strict’ they were, and whether they affected 
manufacturers or were ‘not enforced’.56–59 In 1996, Philip 
Morris noted that Minnesota’s law prohibited its buydowns.60 61 
In 1998, Philip Morris and local tobacco retailers complained to 
the New Jersey Deputy Attorney General that the state’s UCSA 
should not apply to manufacturer promotions.62 63 In 1999, RJ 
Reynolds realised that in Arkansas, ‘all buydowns from cigarette 
manufacturers are not legal … This will have impact on how we 
handle discounts’64 and Philip Morris noted internally that the 
state was enforcing the law such that ‘nothing will be sold below 
state minimum’.65
After the MsA: illegal price promotions become more 
important to manufacturers
In 2000, RJ Reynolds’ government relations group described 
manufacturers’ increasing concerns about state minimum price 
laws,66 67 noting that UCSAs limited the types, manner, cost and 
flexibility of manufacturer promotions, which were needed ‘to 
stimulate cigarette sales’.68
The current environment surrounding the cigarette industry 
has caused manufacturers to promote more regularly, to offer 
higher price discounts and to target promotions more specifi-
cally to certain types of consumers or retail outlets. Causes for 
these increases in activity and value are:
 ► MSA regulation (which restricts traditional advertising 
venues).
 ► Higher excise taxes.
 ► Higher production costs.
 ► Competition for fewer smokers
 ► Competition from (discount brands) (bullets in original).68
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Table 1 States classified by their likelihood of enforcing minimum 
price laws according to RJR in 200012
Most likely somewhat likely least likely ‘no problems’
Arkansas Connecticut Delaware California
Iowa Indiana District of Columbia Colorado
Massachusetts Maryland Kentucky Hawai'i
Nebraska Mississippi Louisiana Idaho
New Jersey Montana Minnesota Maine
Ohio Rhode Island Nevada North Dakota
Pennsylvania Wisconsin Oklahoma Wyoming
South Dakota
Tennessee
West Virginia
RJR, RJ Reynolds.
In March 2000, the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance 
Compliance Division told tobacco distributors that it would 
‘become more aggressive in the enforcement’ of the state’s 
UCSA.69 In April 2000, New York State regulators determined 
that manufacturer promotions could not be used to reduce retail 
prices.70 In response, RJ Reynolds’ sales departments complained 
to the company’s government relations and legal departments 
that ‘long standing [manufacturer promotion] programs are now 
considered a violation [of state law]’.70 The Philip Morris Corpo-
rate Affairs division expressed similar concerns.71 By May 2000, 
it became clear to manufacturers that their post- MSA marketing 
strategies to reduce consumer prices were illegal under most 
existing minimum price laws.12 72 73
The RJ Reynolds’ government relations team summarised the 
problem for the sales and management groups in 2000:
[M]ost states … stipulate that cigarette wholesalers and retailers 
in the state must be granted the same prices uniformly across the 
state in order for any pricing program to be legal … Recently, 
the methods used by manufacturers to effect promotions have 
changed. In addition the frequency and value of these promotions 
has increased. These changes have taken place because of 
changes in allowable methods for marketing cigarettes (ie, MSA 
restrictions) … This has resulted in more selective placement of 
promotions, as opposed to placement with all wholesalers and/
or retailers in a state … some states have begun to restrict or 
even ban some forms of manufacturers’ promotions [particularly 
buydowns] as a violation of their UCSAs …12
The team noted that this situation created ‘significant prob-
lems in effectively marketing … consumers will be faced with 
consistently higher prices…12 UCSAs were blocking the compa-
nies’ use of selective price promotions as marketing devices.
2000–2010: tobacco manufacturers revised laws to protect 
price promotions
In May 2000, the RJ Reynolds’ government relations group 
created a list of states with minimum price laws that it believed 
were ‘most likely to create a “New York- Style” promotional 
crisis … [A]ny state listed below [could] institute a full or partial 
promotional ban based on existing law’.12 The company divided 
the states with minimum price laws into categories indicating 
perceived likelihood of enforcement, noting additional states 
where existing law did not affect promotional activity (table 1).12 
They complained that states were unwilling to ‘administer laws 
flexibly’.74
To address this concern, in June 2000 RJ Reynolds, the manu-
facturer that had self- identified as most dependent on price 
promotions,75 began a coordinated campaign in collaboration 
with regional directors at Brown & Williamson, Lorillard and 
Philip Morris to amend state minimum price laws to permit 
manufacturer promotions.76 77 As of July 2000, these compa-
nies had collected the text of existing state laws for legal review. 
Lawyers working for the RJ Reynolds’ government relations 
groups concurred with state regulators that most state laws either 
‘expressly’ banned manufacturer promotions or clearly intended 
to do so.78–80 The industry group determined that working 
directly with enforcement agencies or litigating was unlikely to 
be successful due to regulatory efforts to reduce tobacco use, 
and because prior court challenges of pricing restrictions had 
failed.68 Following this determination, RJ Reynolds’ government 
relations group began drafting amendments to existing state laws 
to specifically allow manufacturer promotions.78–80
By August 2000, the RJ Reynolds- led lobbying effort had 
created a list of ‘allies by state’,81 although it expressed concern 
that there had been ‘erosion of support’.82 At the same time, 
it developed plans to intervene in states that were most likely 
to enforce their laws.83–85 In September 2000 meeting, the 
lobbying team concluded that ‘the best course of action is to 
concentrate the initial efforts in states where the risk of exces-
sive enforcement under current law is considered to be the 
greatest’.86 In Ohio, for example, RJ Reynolds’ regional sales 
directors believed enforcing state law as written would ‘alter or 
eliminate the company’s marketing practices’.87 As a result, the 
group concluded that ‘acquiescence (is) not a viable option’.68
In November 2000, the lobbying group finalised proposed 
amendments to state laws. ‘[M]anufacturers promotions do not 
fall within the operation of the UCSA … states with UCSAs 
can still protect wholesalers and retailers from unfair competi-
tion within each group because wholesalers and retailers would 
still be prohibited from selling below cost … at the same time, 
manufacturers could run promotions benefiting consumers 
without fear of challenge under these laws’.88 Amending existing 
laws would allow manufacturers to discount the cost of ciga-
rettes to consumers by excluding manufacturer promotions 
from minimum price calculations, legalising an actual cost to 
consumers below the nominal legal minimum price (figure 1, 
column 4). The lobbying team focused on amending state laws 
because ‘legislation can specifically address concerns, can be 
pursued prior to the development of an emergency situation, 
can be quietly abandoned if badly received, if successful, conclu-
sively fixes the problem’.68
In December 2000, RJ Reynolds’ lobbying team picked 
five states as priority targets, although it did not describe the 
reasoning behind these choices.89 In statements drafted for advo-
cacy, they argued that ‘[s]tate unfair cigarette laws should not 
be used to bar manufacturer price promotions’ because if they 
did, ‘such promotions will be driven out of the tobacco industry’ 
leading consumers to purchase cigarettes in lower tax localities 
(emphasis in original).90 In contrast, the company knew, based 
on internal research, that most consumers would not travel to 
lower- cost areas.91 That month, as RJ Reynolds anticipated, the 
Nebraska Department of Revenue determined that manufacturer 
promotions could not be used to reduce consumer prices under 
existing law.92
At the beginning of 2001, RJ Reynolds’ government relations’ 
second highest priority, after blocking tobacco tax increases, 
was to preserve manufacturer price promotions by changing 
state laws93 94; Lorillard expressed similar concerns.95 RJ Reyn-
olds’ lobbying team added five more states to its 2001 target 
list.96 By February 2001, the RJ Reynolds’ government rela-
tions team advocated to change minimum price laws to protect 
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manufacturer promotions in eight more states.97 The same 
month Lorillard sued the New York Department of Taxation to 
reinstate Lorillard’s price promotions.98 In March, legislators 
introduced multiple bills to protect manufacturer discounts; 
in Arkansas, for example, a bill sought to ‘clarify that cigarette 
manufacturers buy down (or paperless coupons) for reducing the 
retail sales price of cigarettes sold by Arkansas retailers do not 
violate the provisions of the Unfair Cigarette Sales Act’.99
In April 2001, the RJ Reynolds’ lobbying team reported that 
amendments of state minimum price laws to protect manufac-
turer promotions were introduced in Louisiana100 and passed in 
West Virginia.101 In May, RJ Reynolds reported both regulatory 
setbacks and legislative successes.102–104 By June, nine states had 
introduced amendments to protect manufacturer promotions, 
including Minnesota; many used language drafted by RJ Reyn-
olds’ lobbyists.103 105–107 At the end of 2001, five states had passed 
legislation that changed the method of calculating prices and 
one had relaxed regulatory enforcement (Nebraska).106 108–115 RJ 
Reynolds received occasional input from counterparts at Loril-
lard and Brown & Williamson throughout this time period.
At the beginning of 2002, RJ Reynolds’ government relations 
team believed that amendments protecting manufacturer promo-
tions would pass in at least four more states that year, might pass 
in another and were unlikely in one more.116–120 The team later 
noted that its bill was enacted in Ohio in June121; ultimately at 
least three states modified their method of calculating prices in 
2002.121–123
In 2003, Lorillard’s 2001 lawsuit against the New York 
Department of Taxation to protect industry promotions failed, 
as the company had originally anticipated in drafting a plan 
that focused on legislative advocacy.124 Its legislative efforts had 
been more successful. RJ Reynolds’ lobbyists reported in March 
2003 that new bills had been introduced in seven states.125 126 
At the end of 2003, nine states had amended legislation on ciga-
rette price calculations.127–135 A year- end report prepared for 
RJ Reynolds by the management consulting firm Booz Allen 
Hamilton noted that 18 of the 26 states with minimum price 
laws protected manufacturer promotions, and that ‘we don’t 
expect mandated price increases in any of the states’.136
RJ Reynolds noted in its retail plans for 2004 that it would 
continue to expand manufacturer promotions.137 In 2004 and 
2005, modifications of price calculations passed in two addi-
tional states.138 139 Minimum price laws were also undervalued by 
governments outside the US; in 2006, the European Union (EU) 
supported the tobacco industry’s position on minimum price 
laws by preventing six member states from creating them.140 141
In 2007, RJ Reynolds created a ‘New Growth Innovation 
Roadmap’ that ranked the threat of existing and potential regu-
lation from ‘Important’ to ‘Not important’. The company’s 
worst- case 5- year scenario planning explained that addressing 
minimum price regulation was ‘Important’ because ‘states 
(could) ban differential discounting by interpretation of fair 
trade laws’.142 RJ Reynold’s October 2008 internal corporate 
report concurred, noting that discounting was important ‘to 
marketplace performance. We use the $2.5 billion (we spend on) 
discounting to negotiate with (retailers)’.143
At least one more state amended its cigarette price calcula-
tion in 2008.144 In 2000, RJ Reynolds had ranked states by their 
likelihood of creating a ‘promotional crisis’ due to regulatory 
agencies enforcing existing laws (table 1). By 2009, after the 
company’s lobbying campaign, 71% of the states it identified as 
‘most likely’ to do so had modified their laws, as well as 57% of 
those identified as ‘somewhat likely’, half of those listed as ‘least 
likely’ and a handful of others.
dIsCussIOn
Beginning in 2000, tobacco manufacturers sought to modify 
state minimum price laws and their enforcement because price 
promotions had become critical to attracting and retaining 
consumers after stricter tobacco control policies, particularly 
the MSA, eliminated or restricted traditional marketing options. 
When manufacturers realised that existing state minimum price 
laws made their promotional techniques illegal, they sought to 
change them to allow tobacco manufacturers to continue to 
manipulate consumer prices. Proposed modifications to state 
minimum price laws drew limited attention or opposition from 
health advocates at the time.145
A 2015 University of Chicago report on state tobacco laws 
found that of the 31 states with minimum price laws, 26 protected 
manufacturer promotions and that only four had adjusted the 
amount or percentage by which they marked up prices since 
2005.33 Protecting manufacturer promotions in minimum price 
laws undercuts these laws’ public health effectiveness; these 
promotions reduce the consumer costs of tobacco so much so 
that consumers in states with these laws pay prices comparable 
with consumers in states without them.23 33 35 Rapid development 
of alternative tobacco products further undercuts the effective-
ness of existing laws. Even states with minimum price laws apply 
them primarily to combustible cigarettes; only seven states cover 
other nicotine and tobacco products.33 Current minimum price 
laws are ineffective not only because they allow manufacturer 
promotions, but also because their scope is generally limited to a 
single product type: combustible cigarettes.
Price promotions have allowed manufacturers to attenuate the 
effects of state and local excise tax increases, which would other-
wise reduce cigarette consumption by raising consumer prices. 
Legal protection of manufacturer promotions under minimum 
price laws has allowed the tobacco industry to blunt the effects 
of increased taxes, and led to price promotions becoming the 
tobacco industry’s largest share of advertising.6 Many states and 
countries have not established minimum price laws at all.
The efforts of tobacco manufacturers to undercut the effec-
tiveness of minimum price laws were unreported at the time 
they happened, and these policies have remained largely 
unchanged for over a decade. More recently, however, localities 
have addressed tobacco discounts. In 2013, Providence, Rhode 
Island banned price discounting with support from the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention and the Tobacco Control 
Legal Consortium; this intervention was specifically designed 
to address weaknesses in the state law and survived multiple 
tobacco industry lawsuits.146 In 2014, New York City established 
a floor price for cigarettes and little cigars147 and expanded the 
scope and minimum price in 2018148; Chicago created a similar 
policy in 2016.33 This example demonstrates the opportunities 
for localities, states and countries to implement laws and poli-
cies that limit promotions and reduce manufacturers’ ability to 
manipulate prices, unless state or national preemption prevents 
them from doing so. These cases also suggest that tobacco 
companies’ recent efforts to rebrand themselves as ‘good corpo-
rate citizens’ are discarded when tobacco sales are threatened.
Our findings have limitations. Tobacco industry documents 
provide incomplete information and corporate lobbyists have 
incentives to overstate their effectiveness. To address this, we 
sought to validate their claims about bills introduced and legis-
lation enacted in external archives. Certain potentially relevant 
documents were marked as confidential or privileged commu-
nication, and so not public.149 150 Although our findings suggest 
that tobacco companies successfully lobbied multiple states to 
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change their laws given the use of industry- generated language in 
proposed and enacted legislation, states may have enacted these 
changes for independent reasons. There is limited research on 
ways that tobacco companies using specific pricing promotions 
for different product lines (eg, premium vs discount brands); 
having these data would be useful in enforcing and modifying 
tobacco control policies addressing prices.
Although tobacco control advocates have devoted little atten-
tion to minimum price laws as policy interventions,28 these laws 
can work in tandem with tax increases to raise prices and reduce 
tobacco use and health disparities.23 As long as tobacco price 
discounts are protected by state law, these benefits will not be 
realised. Revising and expanding minimum price laws to elim-
inate manufacturer promotions and cover alternative nicotine 
and tobacco products could further reduce tobacco use and 
tobacco- induced disease.
What this paper adds
What is already known on this subject
 ► Although multiple jurisdictions have laws that set a minimum 
price for tobacco, typically consumers in jurisdictions with 
these laws pay prices comparable with consumers in 
jurisdictions without them. This is caused in part because 
many existing laws allow tobacco manufacturers to provide 
discounts that lower consumer prices below the legal 
minimum price.
What important gaps in knowledge exist on this topic
 ► Despite increasing interest in revising minimum price laws 
so that they account for trade discounts in the calculation 
of legal prices, the original justification for privileging 
manufacturer promotions in these laws is unclear.
What this paper adds
 ► Our research identifies how minimum price laws were 
originally formulated, and how they were later amended to 
protect manufacturer promotions. Tobacco manufacturers 
view these promotions as critical to retaining current 
smokers.
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